

26 May 1983

## WARNING VEHICLES

### Problems

General dissatisfaction with Alert Memo  
Impact dampened by consensus

Audience limited and/or unfocused

Too broad dissemination precludes use of most sensitive materials

Too crisis-oriented versus long-term strategic warning  
Smothering of alternative views  
Is self-destructive; i.e., if successful, "threat" is deterred  
Fear of being wrong  
Is most useful early, but also most problematic

### Dichotomies

Consensus language vs crisp, clear warning  
Weight of community product vs timeliness of uncoordinated product  
Repeated warnings vs cry wolf

Broad dissemination vs inclusion of convincing evidence (sensitive material)

Early warning/low probability vs late warning/high probability

### Influencing Factors

1. DCI not in favor of Alert Memo by that name.
2. Inadequacy of existing warning vehicles, SNIE's, ANALITS, DoD warning reports (are they perceived by analysts or recipients as warning?)
3. Need designated report to allow someone to initiate publication. (How and by whom is warning initiated?)
4. "Old Boy" network and informal mechanisms will exist regardless.

5. Desire by all Agencies to coordinate on any warning report.

Objectives

1. Provide a means to issue long-term warning -- formal or informal, coordinated or uncoordinated.

2. Provide a means for minority views to surface without the analyst suffering undue disapprobation.